Bernanke defiende QE3

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

En su testimonio semi-anual ante el Congreso, Ben Bernanke refutó objeciones a las medidas de estímulo de la Fed y defendió la postura de la mayoría del FOMC. Como habíamos anticipado, aprovechó la oportunidad para mitigar temores de que la Fed retiraría el estímulo de manera prematura. Su testimonio fortalece nuestro pronóstico central para QE3: que continuarán las compras de activos a ritmo de $85 MMn hasta por lo menos finales de 2013. Lea el comunicado introductorio y el informe semi-anual de política monetaria de la Fed (resumen, completo). Barclays ($) y NYT escriben que Bernanke defendió el estímulo de la Fed. FT reportó aquí y aquí que el testimonio de Bernanke fue dovish.

El fin de semana pasado publicamos en La Carpeta Negra que Ben Bernanke

Probablemente aprovechará la oportunidad para mitigar y prevenir temores  de que la Fed retirará el estímulo (dará fin a las compras de activos) de manera prematura.

Nos importa porque nuestros tres escenarios de pronóstico descansan sobre el siguiente supuesto (y otros):

La Fed no revierte sus promesas de continuar QE3 hasta observar una mejora sustancial en el mercado laboral y de mantener la tasa de fondos federales excepcionalmente baja hasta que el desempleo caiga por debajo de 6.5%.

Bernanke hizo lo que esperábamos. Explicó que un análisis costo-beneficio conduce a la conclusión de que conviene continuar con el relajamiento cuantitativo (QE). Describió tres costos potenciales (tres riesgos) de continuar:

1. Que se siembre inflación al generar expectativas de inflación.
2. Que se siembre inestabilidad financiera suprimiendo tanto y por tanto tiempo las tasas de interés.
3. Que cause pérdidas en el mismo portafolio de la Fed una vez que suban las tasas de interés, pérdidas que se traducirán en reducciones de ingresos que percibe el Tesoro por parte de la Fed.

Pero considera que estos costos potenciales –riesgos– o están cubiertos o se contrarrestan por los beneficios. Resumimos:

1. El riesgo de que se genere inflación excesiva se cubre con las herramientas de la Fed que sabrá usar en su momento y que resultarán eficaces.
2. El importante riesgo de que se fomente inestabilidad financiera está siendo monitoreado celosamente y prevenido mejor que antes mediante un enfoque de supervisión bancaria más sistémico que en el pasado.
3. El riesgo de que se presenten pérdidas fiscales por el portafolio de la Fed es más que compensada por las ganancias fiscales que resultarán del crecimiento económico fomentado por el QE.

Los pasajes claves del comunicado introductorio de Bernanke (énfasis nuestro):

The Committee also stated that in determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, it will take appropriate account of their likely efficacy and costs. In other words, as with all of its policy decisions, the Committee continues to assess its program of asset purchases within a cost-benefit framework. In the current economic environment, the benefits of asset purchases, and of policy accommodation more generally, are clear: Monetary policy is providing important support to the recovery while keeping inflation close to the FOMC’s 2 percent objective. Notably, keeping longer-term interest rates low has helped spark recovery in the housing market and led to increased sales and production of automobiles and other durable goods. By raising employment and household wealth–for example, through higher home prices–these developments have in turn supported consumer sentiment and spending.

Highly accommodative monetary policy also has several potential costs and risks, which the Committee is monitoring closely. For example, if further expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet were to undermine public confidence in our ability to exit smoothly from our accommodative policies at the appropriate time, inflation expectations could rise, putting the FOMC’s price-stability objective at risk. However, the Committee remains confident that it has the tools necessary to tighten monetary policy when the time comes to do so. As I noted, inflation is currently subdued, and inflation expectations appear well anchored; neither the FOMC nor private forecasters are projecting the development of significant inflation pressures.

Another potential cost that the Committee takes very seriously is the possibility that very low interest rates, if maintained for a considerable time, could impair financial stability. For example, portfolio managers dissatisfied with low returns may “reach for yield” by taking on more credit risk, duration risk, or leverage. On the other hand, some risk-taking–such as when an entrepreneur takes out a loan to start a new business or an existing firm expands capacity–is a necessary element of a healthy economic recovery. Moreover, although accommodative monetary policies may increase certain types of risk-taking, in the present circumstances they also serve in some ways to reduce risk in the system, most importantly by strengthening the overall economy, but also by encouraging firms to rely more on longer-term funding, and by reducing debt service costs for households and businesses. In any case, the Federal Reserve is responding actively to financial stability concerns through substantially expanded monitoring of emerging risks in the financial system, an approach to the supervision of financial firms that takes a more systemic perspective, and the ongoing implementation of reforms to make the financial system more transparent and resilient. Although a long period of low rates could encourage excessive risk-taking, and continued close attention to such developments is certainly warranted, to this point we do not see the potential costs of the increased risk-taking in some financial markets as outweighing the benefits of promoting a stronger economic recovery and more-rapid job creation.

Another aspect of the Federal Reserve’s policies that has been discussed is their implications for the federal budget. The Federal Reserve earns substantial interest on the assets it holds in its portfolio, and, other than the amount needed to fund our cost of operations, all net income is remitted to the Treasury. With the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, yearly remittances have roughly tripled in recent years, with payments to the Treasury totaling approximately $290 billion between 2009 and 2012. However, if the economy continues to strengthen, as we anticipate, and policy accommodation is accordingly reduced, these remittances would likely decline in coming years. Federal Reserve analysis shows that remittances to the Treasury could be quite low for a time in some scenarios, particularly if interest rates were to rise quickly. However, even in such scenarios, it is highly likely that average annual remittances over the period affected by the Federal Reserve’s purchases will remain higher than the pre-crisis norm, perhaps substantially so. Moreover, to the extent that monetary policy promotes growth and job creation, the resulting reduction in the federal deficit would dwarf any variation in the Federal Reserve’s remittances to the Treasury.