BCE y gobierno alemán defienden OMT; Bundesbank lo cuestiona

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

El martes fue el primero de dos días de testimonios sobre la constitucionalidad de algunos programas del Banco Central Europeo y del fondo europeo de rescate. El enfoque fue el programa de transacciones monetarias directas (OMT) del BCE. OMT fue anunciado por el BCE en agosto 2012 pero todavía no ha sido activado. Lo defendió no sólo el BCE mismo (representado por Jörg Asmussen), sino también el gobierno alemán (representado por Wolgang Schäuble). En contra del OMT arguyó el presidente del banco central de Alemania (el Bundesbank) (El País). Open Europe todavía piensa que la corte constitucional alemana fallará a favor del BCE pero que podría imponer algunos límites al programa OMT.

El País resume y destaca que el BCE tiene el apoyo del gobierno alemán:

El Tribunal Constitucional alemán inició este martes en la ciudad de Karlsruhe una histórica vista oral de dos días, que enfrentó en un duelo verbal inédito a Jens Weidmann, el poderoso presidente del Bundesbank y al consejero del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), Jörg Asmussen, dos amigos que hasta no hace mucho trabajaban, mano a mano en el seno del Gobierno federal. Un duelo en el que el BCE contó, dentro y fuera de la corte, con un aliado decisivo, el Ejecutivo de Angela Merkel.

Los jueces deberán decidir si el BCE se excedió en sus funciones y vulneró la carta magna alemana, como se sostiene en el recurso presentado por una plataforma de 37.000 ciudadanos, varios economistas euroescépticos y parlamentarios de la CSU y de La Izquierda. El recurso, admitido por el Constitucional, afirma que el BCE pretende disponer sin base legal del dinero de los contribuyentes alemanes (a través del Bundesbank) para financiar la compra de bonos de países en problemas, tal y como se establece en el programa Transacciones Monetarias Directas (OMT en sus siglas en inglés), aprobado en septiembre.

[…] El Gobierno alemán estuvo representado en la vista oral por el ministro de Finanzas, Wolfgang Schäuble, que defendió la legalidad del programa del banco central europeo. “No vemos indicios de que las medidas emprendidas por el BCE hasta el momento infrinjan su mandato”, declaró el ministro, quien resaltó que el tema no debería estar sujeto a la jurisdicción alemana.

Jörg Asmussen representó al BCE. Resumió su postura así:

The announcement of OMTs was and is the necessary and appropriate step to eliminate the disruption in the transmission of monetary policy caused by concerns that there would be an unwanted break-up of the euro. The risks of not acting would have been greater.

The ECB and its decision-makers are aware of the limits of its monetary policy mandate. Our measures are aimed at maintaining monetary policy transmission and preventing an unwanted break-up of the euro. It is not allowed to, is not able to and does not want to replace the actions of democratically elected governments. Quite the opposite. The OMT programme is therefore aimed at protecting the market mechanism so as to urge the Member States to make the necessary reforms.

The ECB will decide completely independently – on the basis of its own assessment of the situation – when and whether to intervene on the secondary market for government bonds for monetary policy reasons.

Not only do the framework conditions set by the Governing Council of the ECB for OMTs ensure that the ECB acts within its monetary policy mandate, they also ensure compliance with EU law, particularly the prohibition of monetary financing.

I am firmly convinced that introducing the OMT programme was the right thing to do to ensure price stability in the euro area. After all, a currency can only be stable if its continued existence is not in doubt.

Pero explicó los límites que tiene el BCE:

Our mandate is clearly formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: to maintain price stability.

According to primary EU law, the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem are already permitted to purchase government bonds in the financial markets in the context of their monetary policy tasks (Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank).

While the Treaty clearly states the objective the ECB has to pursue, it describes just as clearly what the ECB is not allowed to do.

Article 123 of the Treaty prohibits monetary financing. In particular, we are not allowed to buy any government bonds directly, i.e. on the primary market. Government bonds can only be purchased if they are already on the market and traded freely. The market mechanism – the basic principle Member States have to follow to finance themselves independently – should apply.

We therefore also interpret the prohibition of monetary financing as being comprehensive insofar as ways to circumvent it are addressed. It is not possible to purchase newly issued government bonds at certain times. Furthermore, the central banks of the Eurosystem observe the issuing behaviour of Member States, banks and market players for signs of collusion. If, for example, a country were to convert all its bond issues to a short maturity (of up to three years), we would react.

(Discutimos el artículo 123 en noviembre 2011.)

Open Europe resume los argumentos de Jens Weidmann, presidente del Bundesbank, en contra de OMT:

Warned that ECB OMT blurs the line between monetary and fiscal policy – this makes it more difficult to achieve price stability and spreads solvency risks amongst eurozone countries, but does so without any parliamentary or democratic approval.

Pushed for a narrow interpretation of a central bank’s primary mandate, with a complete focus on price stability.

Suggested that the OMT does represent potential losses for taxpayers, arguing that if the ECB took on significant amounts of risky debt, it may face large a loss which it cannot absorb and may require aid from member states.

Argued that even secondary market purchases can overturn the force of market discipline and undermine fiscal autonomy.

Issued a warning over the interpretation of the real-risk premiums for bonds, which he suggested was very subjective and dependent on future policies.

Accepted that the inflation outlook in the eurozone fits with price stability at the moment, but still expressed serious concern about comprising the ECB’s focus on this.

Open Europe piensa que la postura de Weidmann es la más difícil de defender y que la corte fallará a favor del BCE:

It seems to us that, of the two sides, Weidmann had the tougher case to make. Ultimately, as much of the above shows, he is forced to consider hypothetical scenarios and potential worst cases. These are undoubtedly risks that should be highlighted, but it does leave one feeling that his argument is slightly less clear cut than Asmussen’s.

Having heard the key testimony of both sides, we still expect the court to side with the ECB, but with some caveats (although how strict they will be is very much up in the air).