Crisis temporal de liquidez en China
Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret
La semana pasada, la banca china sufrió una crisis de liquidez: los bancos no encontraron suficientes fondos para cubrir sus requerimientos de corto plazo y se dispararon las tasas de interés que cobran para prestarse dinero a muy corto plazo (Jamie McGeever de Reuters). The Economist explica que la crisis fue causada o exacerbada porque el banco central de China (People’s Bank of China, PBoC) esta vez no mitigó el problema proveyendo liquidez. Analistas interpretaron esta falta de acción por parte del PBoC como una señal de que quiere obligar a los bancos a disminuir lo que considera crédito excesivo. Un comunicado del banco central el lunes confirmó esta explicación (FT). Lo peor parece haber pasado: las tasas de préstamo interbancarias disminuyeron viernes y lunes (Bloomberg). Nomura (citado por FT Alphaville) no espera una crisis financiera en China, pero sí un proceso doloroso de desapalancamiento y una tasa de crecimiento más baja (cayendo a 7.2% interanual en T4).
The Economist explica que la crisis fue causada o exacerbada porque esta vez, a diferencia de otras, el banco central de China (People’s Bank of China, PBoC) no mitigó el problema proveyendo liquidez.
On June 19th China’s interbank market stayed open late as banks scrambled to borrow funds from each other. On June 20th the seven-day repo interest rate shot up to 12%, the highest on record. The Shanghai interbank offered rate (SHIBOR), an average of the rate at which big banks say they will lend, also rose.
In a more mature economy such a spike would be “very scary”, notes Tao Wang of UBS. In such economies central banks set the interest rate at which they will provide funds to banks. If they keep this policy rate steady, then interbank rates can surge only if banks start to doubt each other’s creditworthiness.
In China the central bank’s provision of liquidity is more ad hoc. As a consequence “short-lived cash crunches” are not unusual, says Mark Williams of Capital Economics. This crunch began innocuously enough. Deposits were drained by companies paying taxes and customers withdrawing money in advance of the Dragon Boat holiday on June 10th-12th. A crackdown on illicit capital inflows hit another source of liquidity.
The surprise was that the central bank then did little to ease the strain. Instead of printing money and buying stuff, it decided to sell three-month bills on June 18th, withdrawing money from circulation. The amount was tiny. But the signal was clear: no help could be expected from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Banks with money to spare chose to hoard their funds, worsening the crunch for others.
Analistas interpretaron esta falta de acción por parte del PBoC como una señal de que quiere obligar a los bancos a disminuir lo que considera rédito excesivo. Un comunicado del banco central el lunes confirmó esta explicación (FT):
The Chinese central bank has finally broken its silence over the country’s cash crunch, telling banks the onus is on them to manage their own balance sheets better.
The People’s Bank of China said liquidity was at a “reasonable level” and called on big lenders to do more to help restore calm to the country’s anxious markets.
Interbank rates spiked to double digits last week, even momentarily hitting 28 per cent, before easing. The sudden cash squeeze raised the spectre of a credit crisis in the world’s second-biggest economy and rattled global investors.
[…] After the central bank ordered banks to resume lending to each other late last week, the interbank market came unfrozen and rates began to decline, a process that continued on Monday.
The seven-day bond repurchase rate, a key measure of liquidity, tumbled to 7.32 per cent – more than 100 basis points lower than its close on Friday, though still high by normal standards. With investors worried about the consequences for the broader economy, the Shanghai Composite Index, the country’s main stock index, fell 5.3 per cent to 1,963, its first finish below 2,000 since December last year and its lowest closing level since January 2009.
[…] With China on track for a second straight quarterly slowdown, analysts say the tightening could lead to an even sharper deterioration in growth prospects.
La tasa interdiaria del mercado de dinero se disparó dramáticamente el jueves pasado (Jamie McGeever de Reuters):
Pero lo peor parece haber pasado: las tasas de préstamo interbancarias disminuyeron viernes y lunes (Bloomberg):
The overnight repurchase rate dropped 196 basis points, or 1.96 percentage points, to 6.47 percent in Shanghai, according to a daily fixing compiled by the National Interbank Funding Center. It plunged 442 basis points on June 21, from a record 12.85 percent, and is still more than double this year’s average of 3.09 percent.
Nomura (citado por FT Alphaville) no espera una crisis financiera en China, pero sí un proceso doloroso de desapalancamiento y una tasa de crecimiento más baja (cayendo a 7.2% interanual en T4):
Will China go into a financial crisis?
This is a tricky issue, as the definition of “financial crisis” can differ among investors. We do not think China will experience a crisis like what was experienced in G3 and emerging markets because the banking system is fully controlled by the government, which has the resources to bail out banks, if necessary. In fact, the government has bailed out the banking sector several times over the past 30 years; it last did this in early 2000, when the non-performing loan ratio was 30%. A balance of payments crisis is even more unlikely given China’s USD3.4trn of FX reserves.
Nonetheless, we expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions. In particular, we see risks in local government financing vehicles, trust companies, property developers, credit guarantee companies, and leveraged manufacturers in industries with over-capacity problems. The non-performing loan ratio will likely rise, and we expect GDP growth to trend down to 7.2% y-o-y in Q4.