Crece el endeudamiento y patrimonio de los hogares estadounidenses
Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret
Cullen Roche encuentra en el informe de T3 de cuentas financieras (previamente llamado el informe de “flujo de fondos”) más evidencia de que el desendeudamiento de los hogares llegó a su fin, observando que los pasivos de los hogares crecieron en términos interanuales por primera vez desde que comenzó la crisis de 2007.
Por otra parte, Michael Gavin de Barclays nota que el patrimonio de los hogares siguió creciendo, lo cual ha sido y seguirá siendo un impulso para el consumo. No teme que se trate de una nueva burbuja, ya que no ve las valuaciones e inversiones excesivas asociadas con las de 2000 y 2007. Más bien cree que el factor explicativo son las ganancias corporativas extraordinariamente altas, a la vez explicadas por altos precios de activos. Pero sí piensa que puede haber una corrección abrupta cuando la Fed comience a subir tasas (algo que no creemos ocurrirá antes del 2016).
Cullen Roche sobre el fin del desendeudamiento:
This is a good sign. But we’re by no means back to levels where we were. On the other hand, growth is growth. The economy rarely grows without private sector debt accumulation so this is a sign that balance sheets are normalizing. It’s also a sign that the tapering can begin without worry of imploding the markets. The private sector is really starting to run with the baton here so we shouldn’t be terrified of the government stepping back some of its extraordinary measures here.
Michael Gavin de Barclays (Global Macro Daily, 10 diciembre 2013):
In the US, it can be reasonably said that the recovery of asset prices and repair of balance sheets are essentially complete, but the economic recovery is not. That makes this is an interesting moment to ask what it means to live in a world where monetary policy has such strong leverage over asset prices but much weaker (or, at least substantially delayed) linkages to the real economy. The obvious risk for investors is that the monetary authorities’ attempts to promote a stronger recovery of the real economy will induce them to push asset prices into territory that increase the likelihood of an eventual, potentially sharp, correction. With this in mind, the present state of asset markets, positioning, household balance sheets and other drivers of the world economy is less interesting than where they may plausibly be after another 6-12 months of very easy monetary conditions.
