Presidente de la Fed NY discute nueva tasa de política monetaria (y otros temas)

Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret

Resumen: En un discurso el pasado 20 de mayo, el presidente de la Fed de NY, William Dudley, dio detalles sobre una tasa nueva que la Fed podría introducir para controlar las tasas del mercado monetario. Se trata de una tasa que la Fed ofrecería por depósitos de dinero interdiarios y que pondría un piso debajo de la tasa comparable del mercado de dinero. Pero el discurso tocó varios otros temas. Dudley explico por qué cree que la inflación tenderá al alza lentamente en los siguientes dos años. Sobre el objetivo de 2%, dijo que para él no es un techo. Con respecto a la fecha del primer aumento de tasas, no dio ningún detalle sobre su preferencia, pero notó que el mercado de futuros y las proyecciones económicas del FOMC de marzo implican que la expectativa mediana es de un aumento a mediados de 2015. Explicó por qué cree que las tasas de interés permanecerán por debajo de su promedio histórico durante varios años. Y argumentó que, al momento de comenzar la normalización de la política monetaria (aumentar tasas), la Fed debería mantener sin cambio el tamaño de su balance (reinvertir los ingresos por bonos vencidos) mientras comienza a elevar tasas, en vez de cumplir la intención vigente de permitir que el balance se encoja pasivamente al mismo tiempo que las tasas suben.

Dudley explicó por qué cree que la inflación tenderá al alza (el PCE fue de 1.1% en marzo) pero no espera fuertes presiones para la inflación en los siguientes dos años:

With respect to the outlook for prices, I think that inflation will drift upwards over the next year, getting closer to the FOMC’s 2 percent objective for the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. Some of the factors holding down inflation—such as the cut in Medicare reimbursement rates last April—were one-offs and are now dropping out of the year-over-year figures. In some other areas, such as owners’ equivalent rent, price pressures look likely to firm somewhat.

That said, I see little prospect of inflation climbing sharply over the next year or two. There still are considerable margins of excess capacity available in the economy—especially in the labor market—that should moderate price pressures. Most notably, the trend of labor compensation is running at only about a 2 percent annualized pace. This is far below the roughly 3½ percent pace that would be consistent with trend productivity growth of 1 to 1½ percent and the FOMC’s 2 percent inflation objective.

Sobre el objetivo de inflación de 2%, dijo que para él no es un techo. En tiempos normales, esperaría que la tasa de inflación pasara la misma cantidad de tiempo por arriba del objetivo que por debajo. Más aún, piensa que, mientras el mercado laboral no se haya recuperado, habría que tolerar que la inflación persistiera ligeramente por arriba del objetivo.

I think there is some confusion as to whether the FOMC’s 2 percent inflation objective is a ceiling or not. My own view is that 2 percent is definitely not a ceiling. Once we reach 2 percent, I would expect that we would spend as much time slightly above 2 percent as below it, recognizing that we will hardly ever be exactly at 2 percent because of the inherent volatility in prices. If inflation were to drift above 2 percent, all else equal, then we would tend to resist such a rise. But, if inflation were slightly above 2 percent even as unemployment remained far above levels consistent with maximum employment, then the unemployment consideration would dominate because we would be further from the unemployment objective than we are from the inflation objective. This should not surprise anyone. This is what our “balanced approach” implies.

Con respecto a cuándo será el primer aumento de tasas, no dio ningún detalle sobre su preferencia. Sin embargo, en una nota al pie mencionó que el mercado de futuros y las proyecciones económicas del FOMC de marzo implican que la expectativa mediana es un aumento a mediados de 2015.

En el largo plazo, ve tres razones por las cuales las tasas de interés permanecerán por debajo del promedio histórico. Primero, porque algunos lastres a la actividad económica persistirán algunos años más. Segundo, el crecimiento más lento de la fuerza laboral por el envejecimiento de la población y el crecimiento moderado en la productividad implican una tasa de crecimiento potencial del PIB más baja que antes. Tercero, porque los bancos ahora tienen mayores requerimientos de capital y esto, ceteris paribus, implica márgenes de intermediación más amplios.

In terms of the level of rates over the longer-term, I would expect them to be lower than historical averages for three reasons. First, economic headwinds seem likely to persist for several more years. While the wealth loss following the financial crisis has largely been reversed, the Great Recession has scarred households and businesses­—this is likely to lead to greater precautionary saving and less investment for a long time. Also, as noted earlier, headwinds in the housing area seem likely to dissipate only slowly.

Second, slower growth of the labor force due to the aging of the population and moderate productivity growth imply a lower potential real GDP growth rate as compared to the 1990s and 2000s. Because the level of real equilibrium interest rates appears to be positively related to potential real GDP growth, this slower trend implies lower real equilibrium interest rates even after all the current headwinds fully dissipate.

Third, changes in bank regulation may also imply a somewhat lower long-term equilibrium rate. Consider that, all else equal, higher capital requirements for banks imply somewhat wider intermediation margins. While higher capital requirements are essential in order to make the financial system more robust, this is likely to push down the long-term equilibrium federal funds rate somewhat.

Putting all these factors together, I expect that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with 2 percent PCE inflation over the long run is likely to be well below the 4¼ percent average level that has applied historically when inflation was around 2 percent. Precisely how much lower is difficult to say at this point in time.

The fact that the equilibrium real federal funds rate is likely to be lower for a long time underscores the need for caution in applying the benchmark Taylor Rule as a guide to the appropriate stance of monetary policy. As typically applied, the Taylor Rule assumes an equilibrium real rate of interest of 2 percent. This seems much too high in the current economic environment in which headwinds persist, and somewhat too high even when these headwinds fully dissipate.

Dudley argumentó que, al momento de comenzar la normalización de la política monetaria (aumentar tasas), la Fed debería mantener sin cambio el tamaño de su balance (reinvertir los ingresos por bonos vencidos) mientras comienza a elevar tasas, en vez de llevar a cabo su intención publicada en 2011 de permitir que el balance se encoja pasivamente al mismo tiempo que las tasas suben. Dudley recordó que la idea de cerrar sus posiciones en títulos hipotecarios fue rechazado dos años después, cuando Bernanke anunció que el FOMC prefiere mantener estos títulos hasta que venzan.

Also, I think that the language in the June 2011 exit principles with respect to reinvestment needs to be revisited. The exit principles state: “To begin the process of policy normalization, the Committee will likely first cease reinvesting some or all payments of principal on the securities holdings in the SOMA.” There are two considerations that suggest to me that ending the reinvestments prior to lift-off may not be the best strategy. First, such a decision might complicate our communications regarding the process of normalization. Ending reinvestments as an initial step risks inadvertently bringing forward any tightening of financial conditions as this might foreshadow the impending lift-off date for rates in a manner inconsistent with the Committee’s intention.

Second, when conditions permit, it would be desirable to get off the zero lower bound in order to regain some monetary policy flexibility. This goal would argue for lift-off occurring first followed by the end of reinvestment, rather than vice versa. Delaying the end of reinvestment puts the emphasis where it needs to be—getting off the zero lower bound for interest rates. In my opinion, this is far more important than the consequences of the balance sheet being a little larger for a little longer.

Finalmente, dio detalles sobre una tasa nueva que la Fed podría introducir para controlar las tasas del mercado monetario. Se trata de una “tasa interdiaria de depósito”: una tasa sobre operaciones de reporto reverso de 24 horas. La idea es establecer un piso debajo de la tasa comparable del mercado de dinero.

With respect to the issue of how the FOMC will control money market rates with an enlarged balance sheet, the Federal Reserve already has the necessary tool—the ability to pay interest on excess reserves. However, the degree of control could be further buttressed. Enhancing confidence in the Fed’s ability to control money market rates, and hence, inflation, might also help keep inflation expectations well anchored.

One method the Fed has been testing is an overnight, fixed rate, reverse repo (RRP) facility. The Federal Reserve posts a fixed interest rate and accepts cash from counterparties, which include some banks, dealers, money market funds, and government sponsored enterprises, on an overnight basis in return for a security. The repo facility is “reverse” because the direction in which the funds and securities move—participants are lending funds to the Fed rather than vice versa. Users of the facility are making the economic equivalent of an overnight collateralized loan of cash to the Federal Reserve.

If implemented, the facility could be set up as “full allotment,” which means that there is no cap on the amount of funds accepted from any of its counterparties at the posted overnight interest rate. Or, caps could be imposed on either an aggregate or per counterparty basis in order to limit total usage.

The amount of funds invested in the facility is likely to be sensitive to the spread between the posted interest rate and comparable money market rates and the level of caps placed on usage. The narrower the spread to comparable money market rates, the greater the participation is likely to be. In our ongoing tests with this facility, the New York Desk has varied the RRP rate from 1 to 5 basis points and the cap on usage by counterparty has gradually been increased to its current level of $10 billion. As expected, narrower spreads to comparable money market rates and larger caps have led to greater usage.

Although the testing process is still ongoing, early results suggest that the overnight RRP facility will set a floor under money market rates.

Su discurso completo contiene más detalles técnicos sobre esta tasa, su relación con las otras tasas de la Fed y sus implicaciones para la estabilidad financiera.