Lockhart: QE3 no está descartado, pero la situación actual no lo amerita
Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret
En discursos en Tokio y Hong Kong esta semana, el presidente de la Fed de Atlanta y miembro votante del FOMC Dennis Lockhart explicó los objetivos particulares de las medidas de política monetaria de la Fed desde la crisis (QE1, QE2, Operation Twist y el cambio en estrategia de comunicación). Dijo también que QE3 no está descartado, pero que las circunstancias actuales están lejos de requerirlo (Bloomberg).
Lockhart argumenta que las medidas llamadas “de relajamiento cuantitativo” tenían objetivos particulares con motivaciones específicas que iban más allá que la simple expansión del balance del banco central.
En primera ronda (QE1), el objetivo era sostener la provisión de liquidez de la economía para que el mercado de crédito no se paralizara.
I believe that the motivations of the two policy actions were more distinct than the QE1 and QE2 labels suggest.
In my view, these purchase programs played an important role in the transition away from the emergency lending facilities created earlier in the crisis. The emergency credit facilities worked well to stem the downward spiral of the immediate post-Lehman period. Financial markets began the process of repair during the first half of 2009 but were still suffering from relatively serious liquidity pressures. The QE1 operation sustained the liquidity support that had been previously provided by lending through the emergency facilities.
Because asset purchases largely replaced emergency loans made during the crisis, the net increase in the Fed’s balance sheet was relatively modest. In this sense, the quantitative easing label is misleading. The intent and effect of the policy was not to inject a new and sizable quantity of reserves into the economy. Rather, the effect was to sustain liquidity in still struggling and fragile financial markets, particularly those related to residential real estate. For that reason, I prefer the term “credit easing” to describe this policy action.
En la segunda ronda (QE2), el objetivo sí fue expandir el tamaño del balance para evitar la deflación estimulando la economía y las expectativas.
I view QE2 differently. The FOMC formally announced QE2 in November 2010, with its decision to purchase $600 billion in longer-term Treasury securities. However, the policy was signaled in an important speech from Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in August of that year. The circumstances at the time were dominated by a falling trend in measured inflation, weakening inflation expectations, and rising probabilities of outright deflation. Each of these developments was effectively reversed as the expectations for QE2 took root, expectations that were ultimately validated by FOMC action.
Unlike QE1, QE2 did materially expand the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. In my view, this distinction is important. The intent and effect of the two rounds of asset purchases were different. QE1 served to maintain liquidity at a time when financial markets were exceptionally unsettled. In contrast, QE2 was a more traditional monetary action to preserve price stability.
Lockhart también compartió su perspectiva sobre la fase más reciente de medidas de política monetaria: más operaciones relacionadas con el balance de la Fed, y cambios en la estrategia de comunicación. Tales medidas, dice, tienen en parte el objetivo de mantener la postura monetaria acomodaticia.
The latest phase of policy actions involves further balance sheet operations and enhanced and expanded communication.
In August of last year, the FOMC replaced its existing forward guidance on interest rates. Prior to that date, the language indicated only that interest rates were likely to remain at exceptionally low levels for an extended period. This language was replaced in August with more explicit guidance that spelled out the meaning of “extended period.” Specifically, at that time the FOMC indicated its expectation that economic conditions would warrant very low interest rates at least through mid-2013. Subsequently, that guidance was updated to late 2014.
In September of last year, the FOMC announced its Maturity Extension Program (MEP), often referred to as “Operation Twist.”
In terms of intent and effect, I think of the explicit forward guidance and the MEP in similar terms. We have entered a phase of the recovery in which sustained monetary accommodation is warranted in order to preserve and advance what is still modest progress on employment and economic growth. Importantly, this modest progress is occurring in the context of what, for me, is acceptable performance with respect to our price stability mandate. Actions that reinforce the maintenance of policy accommodation are appropriate. It is through that lens that I view the MEP and explicit forward guidance on policy rates.
Entra en detalle sobre la importancia de la comunicación de los bancos centrales.
[…] It’s useful, I think, to conduct a thought experiment about central bank communication. Let’s consider what constitutes perfect communication. I would argue that communication approaches perfection when the broad, attentive public understands how the monetary authority is going to behave. Put differently, there would be near-perfect certainty about the monetary authority’s reaction function under all circumstances.
In this imagined world, consumers, businesses, savers, and investors can make appropriate adjustments to their decisions and behaviors as each indication of the economy’s trajectory becomes known. They can do so because they have certainty about what the policy reality will be. In this world, communication promotes the efficient functioning of financial markets. Risk premiums come down and rates are lower than they otherwise would have been. Both markets and individuals can be confident policy surprises won’t complicate outcomes. And with that confidence and certainty, the mutually reinforcing roles of economic agents and policymakers become tightly synchronized in a causal loop.
In my view, working toward this end is the right undertaking of the FOMC at this moment, even if it is not fully achievable. The FOMC should continue to clarify its strategy for the medium and long term so that the public can discern how the committee arrives at decisions. In that vein, effective communication that results in the public knowing the extent of uncertainty policymakers face also helps.
Lockhart terminó su discurso diciendo que para él la opción de QE3 debe seguir en la mesa, pero las circunstancias hoy no lo requieren.
[…] As popular as it might be in some quarters to rule out further LSAPs (QE3, as it is known), I do not think this option can be taken off the table. QE3 will work under the right circumstances. But I don’t believe such circumstances prevail at this time.
En Hong Kong el día siguiente, reiteró que se requerirían circunstancias mucho peores que las de hoy para justificar otra ronda de relajamiento cuantitativo, reporta Bloomberg:
“The bar for initiating another round of quantitative easing should remain high,” Lockhart said today in response to questions after a speech in Hong Kong. In order to support more bond buying, “I would have to see a serious deterioration of the economy,” such as “real layoffs, real job destruction” or the threat of falling prices, he said.