La Fed anticipa que último taper sea en octubre y discute más sobre la normalización
Genevieve Signoret & Patrick Signoret
La minuta de la reunión del Comité Federal de Mercado Abierto (FOMC) del 17-18 de junio reveló que el Comité planea seguir reduciendo el ritmo de compras de activos en $10 MMn cada seis semanas hasta finales de octubre, cuando anunciará un último recorte de $15 MMn. En otras palabras, la Fed dejará de expandir su balance a partir de noviembre.
La minuta también compartió las discusiones de la Fed sobre cómo normalizar la política monetaria. La mayoría de los miembros está de acuerdo en tener tres tasas de política: la actual (fondos federales), la tasa de interés sobre el exceso de reservas (IOER) y una tasa de recompra reversa para el mercado de dinero (overnight reverse repurchase agreement, ON RRP). Además, la mayoría de los miembros quiere mantener estable el tamaño del balance hasta después del primer aumento de tasas. (Fed).
El pasaje sobre el último taper de $15 MMn:
Some committee members had been asked by members of the public whether, if tapering in the pace of purchases continues as expected, the final reduction would come in a single $15 billion per month reduction or in a $10 billion reduction followed by a $5 billion reduction. Most participants viewed this as a technical issue with no substantive macroeconomic consequences and no consequences for the eventual decision about the timing of the first increase in the federal funds rate–a decision that will depend on the Committee’s evolving assessments of actual and expected progress toward its objectives. In light of these considerations, participants generally agreed that if incoming information continued to support its expectation of improvement in labor market conditions and a return of inflation toward its longer-run objective, it would be appropriate to complete asset purchases with a $15 billion reduction in the pace of purchases in order to avoid having the small, remaining level of purchases receive undue focus among investors. If the economy progresses about as the Committee expects, warranting reductions in the pace of purchases at each upcoming meeting, this final reduction would occur following the October meeting.
Pasajes de la discusión sobre cómo normalizar:
Most participants agreed that adjustments in the rate of interest on excess reserves (IOER) should play a central role during the normalization process. It was generally agreed that an ON RRP facility with an interest rate set below the IOER rate could play a useful supporting role by helping to firm the floor under money market interest rates. One participant thought that the ON RRP rate would be the more effective policy tool during normalization in light of the wider variety of counterparties eligible to participate in ON RRP operations. The appropriate size of the spread between the IOER and ON RRP rates was discussed, with many participants judging that a relatively wide spread–perhaps near or above the current level of 20 basis points–would support trading in the federal funds market and provide adequate control over market interest rates. Several participants noted that the spread might be adjusted during the normalization process. A couple of participants suggested that adequate control of short-term rates might be accomplished with a very wide spread or even without an ON RRP facility. A few participants commented that the Committee should also be prepared to use its other policy tools, including term deposits and term reverse repurchase agreements, if necessary. Most participants thought that the federal funds rate should continue to play a role in the Committee’s operating framework and communications during normalization, with many of them indicating a preference for continuing to announce a target range. However, a few participants thought that, given the degree of uncertainty about the effects of the Committee’s tools on market rates, it might be preferable to focus on an administered rate in communicating the stance of policy during the normalization period.
[…] While generally agreeing that an ON RRP facility could play an important role in the policy normalization process, participants discussed several potential unintended consequences of using such a facility and design features that could help to mitigate these consequences. Most participants expressed concerns that in times of financial stress, the facility’s counterparties could shift investments toward the facility and away from financial and nonfinancial corporations, possibly causing disruptions in funding that could magnify the stress. In addition, a number of participants noted that a relatively large ON RRP facility had the potential to expand the Federal Reserve’s role in financial intermediation and reshape the financial industry in ways that were difficult to anticipate. Participants discussed design features that could address these concerns, including constraints on usage either in the aggregate or by counterparty and a relatively wide spread between the ON RRP rate and the IOER rate that would help limit the facility’s size. Several participants emphasized that, although the ON RRP rate would be useful in controlling short-term interest rates during normalization, they did not anticipate that such a facility would be a permanent part of the Committee’s longer-run operating framework.
[…] Many participants agreed that ending reinvestments at or after the time of liftoff would be best, with most of these participants preferring to end them after liftoff. These participants thought that an earlier change to the reinvestment policy would involve risks to the economic outlook if it was seen as suggesting that the Committee was likely to tighten policy more rapidly than currently anticipated or if it had unexpectedly large effects in MBS markets; moreover, an early change could add complexity to the Committee’s communications at a time when it would be clearer to signal changes in policy through interest rates alone.